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In  recent  years,  the  United  States'  share  of  world  grain  exports  has
declined  and  as  a  result  the  competitiveness  of  the  U.S.  in  international
markets  has  come  into  question.  Recent  discussions  on  United  States  farm
policy  have  also  induced  tremendous  debate  on  this  topic.  The  purpose  of  this
study  is  to  briefly  describe  the  structural  characteristics  of  the
international  wheat  market  in  the  1980s.
Following  a  period  of  oligopolistic  interdependence  between  some  of  the
major  exporters,  the  U.S.  is  posed  currently  as  the  price  leader.  All  other
exporting  countries  are  price  takers  and  produce  and  export  along  their  export
supply  function.  Recent  competitive  behavior  of  the  major  exporters  is
described  which  tends  to  support  this  market  structure.
vStructural  Characteristics  of  the
International  Wheat  Market*
William  W. Wilson*
World  trade  in  wheat  increased  rapidly  during  the  1970s  (especially
during  the  latter  1970s)  and  began  to  stabilize  in  the  1980s  after  crossing  the
100  million  metric  tonnes  (MMT)  level  in  1981  (Figure  1).1  Trade  peaked  in
1984/85  at  105.6  MMT,  largely  due  to  record  purchases  by  the  USSR,  but  world
trade  is  estimated  to  decrease  in  1985/86  by  5.7  percent  to  99.6  MMT.  U.S.
exports  reached  their  peak  in  1981/82  at  47  MMT  and  have  since  decreased  by  33
percent  to  32.7  MMT  in  1985/86  (estimate).  The  U.S.  market  share  has  also
decreased  from  a recent  peak  in  1981  at  48  percent  to  an  estimated  36  percent
in  1985/86.  The  increase  in  the  world  wheat  trade  since  1981  was  shared  by
each  of  the  major  competitors:  Canada,  Australia,  Argentina,  and  France
(Figure  2).  During  most  of  the  1970s  the  U.S.  loan  rate  was  significantly
below  world  prices  and  did  not  play  an  important  role  in  the  price  structure
for  world  wheat.  However,  in  the  1980s  the  U.S.  loan  rate  began  to  escalate,
world  prices  decreased,  and  the  U.S.  loan  rate  set  a  floor  for  U.S.  prices  and
an  effective  ceiling  for  competition  prices  (Figure  3).2  Recent  proposals  in
the  1985  farm  legislation  call  for  fairly  large  reductions  in  the  U.S.  loan
rate,  an  attempt  to  regain  export  markets.
The  important  trends  are  that  world  trade  has  increased  since  1981/82,
but  U.S.  exports  have  not;  that  growth  in  exports  was  generally  shared  by  each
of  the  competitors;  and  that  the  U.S.  loan  rate  has  increasingly  become  an
important  factor  in  the  structure  of  international  wheat  prices.  The  purpose
of  this  study  is  to  briefly  describe  the  structural  characteristics  of  the
international  wheat  market  in  the  1980s.  The  U.S.  is  posed  as  the  price
leader;  U.S.  loan  rate  and  futures  prices  are  the  reference  price  for  world
trade.  All  other  exporting  countries  are  price  takers  and  produce  and  export
along  their  export  supply  function.
Structural  Characteristics
Traditional  Concepts
The  structure  of  international  competition3  among  exporters  has  evolved
since  the  1950s.  Initially,  the  market  structure  was  described  as  a
*Wilson  is  Associate  Professor,  Department  of  Agricultural  Economics,
North  Dakota  State  University,  Fargo.
1Tables  corresponding  with  each  figure  are  shown  in  the  Appendix.
2Figure  3  is  a  fairly  gross  comparison  because  transport  and  handling
costs  are  not  included  and  the  qualities  are  marginally  different.
3This  paper  is  concerned  primarily  with  the  structural  characteristics
of  exporter  competition.  Thus,  market  power  by  importers  is  not  incorporated
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cooperative  duopoly with Canada  being  the  price  leader  (McCalla 1966).  In  the
mid-1970s a triopoly  was  posed among Canada,  U.S.,  and Australia  (Alaouze,
Watson, and Stugess  1978).  More recently it  appears  that a price leadership
market structure is  more appropriate, with  the  U.S.  being  the  price  leader.
Essential  features of  each  of  these are  first discussed below,  and  then  the
price leadership  model  is  developed  fully.
In  his  seminal  article, McCalla  (1966) described  the  international  wheat
market during  the 1950s  and 60s  as a  cooperative  duopoly with Canada as  the
price leader,  the U.S.  as a price follower, and a  fringe of  other  competitors
acting  as  price  takers.  Market power was  defined as  the willingness and
ability  to  hold  stocks.  Both  the  U.S.  and Canada  had relatively  large  storage
capabilities and  did  undertake extensive  storage,  thereby giving these
countries market power.  Both  countries  had an  objective  to maximize  exports
subject to  the  implied duopoly  relationship.  Canada  set prices,  and the  U.S.
adjusted prices  within a  zone  of  cooperation.  The market structure yielded a
deterministic solution  for  prices  and exports.  However,  the  duopolists'
demand function was  the  residual  from the  aggregate demand and  supply function
of  the fringe,  and  increases in  the  latter  had a  destabilizing influence.
This market structure was  facilitated by a  very active  International
Wheat Agreement  (IWA) which established  price ranges and  values.  In  addition,
the  U.S.  actively  used export subsidies  to  establish export values relative to
Canadian  values,  for  hard  red spring  and for  the other  classes  of  U.S. wheat.
Because  the  IWA reference price for wheat was  for No.  1  Northern,  Canada
effectively set the  daily price for  high protein wheat and  the  U.S.
established prices for  other classes.  The  fringe acted as  price  takers when
selling all  their  exportable supplies.  Thus, Canada was  viewed as  the  price
leader.
Ten years  later  Alaouze, Watson, and Sturgess  (1978)  postulated  the
international  wheat market as a triopoly with Canada  as the  price  leader.
Three pieces  of  evidence  supported this  market structure.  First,  the  storage
capability  of Australia was  increased in  the  post  1966-67 period.  Increased
storage  capacity was viewed as a prerequisite to  market power.  Second,  it
appeared  that Australia  had adopted  a  policy  to not liquidate exportable
stocks in  each marketing year.  This was especially apparent during  1968-69
when they  increased carryover stocks  to  prevent a  price war.  Third,  informal
quarterly  meetings  between Canada and the  U.S.  regarding  price and market
shares now  included Australia.
The model  was  deterministic by  assuming  that Canada was  the  price
leader with  an objective of maximizing revenue.  In  the  period  after 1972  the
triopoly  no  longer  functioned  for a  number  of  reasons.  Of primary  importance
was  that the  large  surpluses were nearly  eliminated due to  the  large grain
purchases  of  the USSR.  Market power required stockholding, and because all
stocks were drastically reduced,  prices  and exports were  thereafter  determined
by  competition.
More recently, Oleson  (1979)  examined  the  structural  characteristics of
the  international  wheat market and  split it  into  three  periods:  1953-62,
1963-72, and 1972-current.  Unlike the  others,  he  placed a great deal  of
importance on  the role  of heterogenous wheat quality  in the establishment and
maintenance of market power.  All  of the other  studies recognized  the-6-
potential  substitutability  of wheat by  class  and origin  but ultimately assumed
them to  be  homogenous.
In  the  1953-62 period, Canada's  dominance in  the  high  protein wheat
market allowed  them a  greater ability  to  exercise market power.  Price ranges
were established via  the  IWA with No.  1  Northern being  the reference class.
Canada was  the  price leader,  setting  and  publishing daily  prices.  During  this
period most of  their  sales were  to  international  traders,  and thus  the  daily
"card  price"  was an  accurate  indicator  of  transaction  prices.  The U.S.,
having a  limited  supply  of  higher protein wheats, accepted  Canada's price
leadership and  established export prices for other  classes using an active
day-to-day export subsidy  scheme.  Fringe competitors  had limited  storage and
followed a  policy of  minimizing year-end  stocks  (Oleson 1979:100).  During
this  period  the  demand for higher  protein wheat was inelastic, and  supplies
from sources  other than  Canada were limited.
From 1963-72  the structure  of  the  international  wheat market was  in
transition.  Canada's  role as  price leader eroded  due to  both supply  and
demand factors  related to  the  higher  protein wheat market.  The U.S.,  and  to a
lesser extent Australia, increased  its  capability  of producing  higher protein
wheat.  In  addition,  the  Chorleywood process was introduced in  the
baking  industry in  the  UK in  the early 1960s  and was adopted elsewhere in
ensuing years.  This  technological  change  resulted in  reduced demand  for
higher  protein wheats.  The combination of  these factors meant a  gradual
reduction in  the  market power  previously maintained by  Canada.  In  addition, a
price war evolved  during  the  late-1960s and  the  International  Wheat Agreement
eventually  broke down.  Meanwhile the  U.S.  became  dissatisfied with  its market
share and made a  very  significant policy  change by  decreasing  its  loan rate to
1300/bushel.  U.S.  domestic  prices were now  closer to world prices and
required  less  of  an  export subsidy, and in  some years none  (see Figure 3).
Canada  tried  to  retain its  role  as a  price  leader during this period,  but
efforts were  increasingly  futile.
The most recent period,  from 1972  to  current, was a  transition from
market determination of  prices  and exports  to  the  United States' becoming the
recognized price  leader in  recent years.  Several  factors contributed to  this
transition.  First, there was a  tremendous expansion in  export demand due to
grain  purchases  by  the USSR, which were absorbed mostly  by  the  U.S.  Second,
the mechanism for  administering export subsidies in  the  U.S. was suspended in
1972;  this marked an  end  to  the  day-to-day  interaction between  U.S.  and
Canadian  agencies in  price establishment.  The  U.S.  policy was  for open-market
pricing  subject  to  the effects  of  loan  rates,  target prices,  supply  control,
and  storage payments.  In  this  action  the U.S.  became  the  price leader with
prices determined in  cash  and futures markets, subject  to  the  operation of
government programs--prices which became world reference prices for  different
classes.  The  third  important factor was that during the early  1970s,  Canada's
exports were restricted due  to  logistics and  transportation  problems which
served as  constraints and  had  an  overriding  influence on  their stockholding
decisions.  Decisions were made  in the mid-1970s  to  solve these problems,  and
thereafter  the apparent Canadian  strategy was  to  export according  to
transportation capabilities, as  opposed  to  stockholding.  This was an
indication of  perceived reduction  in  market power, and Canada essentially
became  a  part  of  the  competitive  fringe.  It  was  during  this  period  that
Canada,  as  part  of  its  strategy,  expanded  use  of  long-term  bilateral- 7-
agreements.  The  "card  price"  no  longer  played  a  central  role  in  pricing,
since  an  increasing  majority  of  the  transactions  were  made  in
government-to-government  negotiations.  The  Canadian  Wheat  Board  (CWB)
recognized  this  as  an  advantage  because  the  main  competitior,  the  U.S.,  set
prices  openly  through  the  market.  The  CWB  could  now  move  target  quantities  by
slightly  undercutting  visible  open  market  prices,  which  are  obviously  an
important  part  of  all  negotiations  (Oleson  1979).
In  summary,  international  competition  in  the  wheat  market  has  evolved
from  a  duopoly  between  Canada  and  the  U.S.,  with  the  former  being  the  price
leader,  to  a  situation  in  which  the  U.S.  now  appears  to  be  the  price  leader.
A number  of  important  factors  contributed  to  this  evolution.  One  was  that  the
earlier  International  Wheat  Agreements  played  important  roles  in  pricing  and
exports  and  was  a  main  facilitator  of  Canada's  price  leadership.  More  recent
wheat  agreements  have  been  of  minimal  influence  with  the  exception  of
informational  exchange.  Concurrently,  the  market  condition  for  higher  protein
wheat  was  changing  in  such  a  way  that  Canada's  market  power  was  eroded.
Indeed,  premiums  traditionally  received  from  Canadian  wheat  have  gradually
been  reduced. 4  Another  important  factor  contributing  to  the  evolution  was
that  use  of  the  daily  export  subsidy  in  the  U.S.  was  suspended  in  1972.  In
the  ensuing  years  the  U.S.  loan  rate  became  an  increasingly  important  factor
in  the  international  price  structure  for  wheat,  even  though  its  purpose  was
not  primarily  related  to  export  competition.
Structural  Characteristics  of  the  Current  Market
In  the  current  market  (during  the  last  four  years)  the  U.S.  is  viewed
as  the  price  leader,  albeit  in  a passive  role,  whereby  the  interaction  of  cash
and  futures  markets  subject  to  the  loan  rate  program  determines  transaction
prices.  Price  leadership  is  viewed  in  the  "dominance"  sense,  whereby  it  is
the  overriding  policy  affecting  the  U.S.  market  which  determines  price  and
output. 5  The  purpose  here  is  to  describe  price  and  quantity  determination  in
a  market  structure  with  the  U.S.  as  the  price  leader  and  with  all  other
exporters  as  the  competitive  fringe.  The  model  is described  briefly  first,
and  then  several  important  comparative  static  effects  are  discussed.  In  the
next  section  evidence  is  discussed  which  supports  this  type  of  market
structure.
The  structural  characteristics  are  based  on  the  dominant  firm  price
leadership  model  [see  Scherer  (1980)  for  a  more  general  description].  In  any
4In  the  period  1964-72  Canadian  wheat  commanded  a 5.1  percent  premium
over  the  world  average;  this  decreased  to  2.4  percent  during  1973-80  (Canadian
Grain  Council  1985:117).
5This  is  as  opposed  to  price  leadership  being  viewed  from  a  short-term
temporal  perspective  as  analyzed  by  Spriggs,  Kaylen,  and  Bessler  (1982)  and
more  recently  by  Lee  and  Cramer  (1985).  In  the  latter  study,  statistical
evidence  indicated  that  some  U.S.  cash  markets  were  the  price  leader  during
1972-81.  However,  this  was  a  period  where  at  least  institutionally  prices
were  determined  competitively  as  discussed  in  the  previous  section.-8  -
oligopolistic  market  structure,  it  is  necessary  to  have  some  mechanism  for
communication.  In  this  case  the  U.S.  is  posed  as  the  price  leader  and  prices
are  determined  through  the  operation  of  the  market  subject  to  the  effects  of
loan  rates.  However,  due  to  the  somewhat  rigid  nature  of  the  loan  rate,  the
U.S.  (as  a  country,  but  not  necessarily  the  markets  located  in  the  U.S.)  plays
a  passive  role,  certainly  within  a  year  and  to  some  extent  between  years,  in
pricing  in  the  export  market.  The  competitive  fringe  includes  all  other
exporters  who  export  along  their  excess  supply  function  and  who  act  as  price
takers.  Each  member  of  the  competitive  fringe  acts  independently  and  is
individually  too  small  to  have  a perceptible  influence  on  price  through  their
output  decisions.  Price  differentials  do  evolve  in  this  market  structure  due
to  product  heterogeneity.
Graphical  solution  to  the  model  is  shown  in  Figure  PL1.  Scf  is  the
aggregate  supply  function  for  the  competitive  fringe.  In  particular  it  is  the
aggregation  of  the  excess  supply  function  for  each  of  the  competing  exporters.
D  is  the  aggregate  export  demand  function  for  wheat  and  is  drawn  to  be
relatively  inelastic.  The  effective  demand  function  for  the  U.S.,  the  price
leader,  is  the  residual  of  DA  and  Scf  and  is  represented  by  ABDA.  If  the  U.S.
aggressively  pursued  an  objective  of  maximizing  export  revenue,  prices  would
be  at  the  point  of  unitary  elasticity  on  the  effective  demand  function  ABDA.
In  addition,  optimal  prices  would  vary  with  shifts  in  either  the  competitive
fringe  supply,  Scf,  or  aggregate  export  demand,  DA.
Given  prices  at  Plr  which  are  determined  via  the  U.S.  loan  rate
mechanisms,  equilibrium  is  achieved.  The  demand  function  for  the  competitive
fringe  is  perfectly  elastic  at  Plr,  and  they  export  OQcf.  U.S.  exports  are  at
OQus  and  aggregate  exports  at  OQA  =  OQus  +  OQcf.  Prices  are  determined  by  the
interaction  of  U.S.  supply  and  demand  subject  to  the  effects  of  the  loan
program.  If  equilibrium  prices  in  the  U.S.  exceed  Plr,  then  prices  and
exports  are  determined  through  competition.  Figure  PL2  shows  this  case  where
equilibrium  prices  P1  > Plr  and  exports  are  OQusI  and  OQcfl  for  the  U.S.  and
competitive  fringe,  respectively.  On  the  other  hand,  with  a  larger  U.S.
supply,  Sus2,  Plr  becomes  the  world  price.  Exports  from  the  competitive
fringe  are  reduced  (a movement  along  their  supply  function),  and  those  from
the  U.S.  increase.  Equilibrium  price  is  Plr,  and  the  U.S.  accumulates  stocks.
Thus,  the  model  allows  for  equilibrium  prices  greater  than  or  equal  to  the
U.S.  loan  rate,  but  in  both  cases  members  of  the  competitive  fringe  act  as
price  takers.
An  important  factor  influencing  changes  in  exports  in  the  assumed  price
leadership  model  is  that  of  exogenous  changes  in  aggregate  exports.  DA1  in
Figure  PL3  represents  an  increase  in  aggregate  demand  relative  to  DA.  As  a
result,  the  effective  demand  for  the  U.S.  becomes  Al  B 1  DAl.  With  price  at
Plr,  U.S.  exports  increase  to  Qus 2 .but  exports  for  the  competitive  fringe
would  be  unchanged.  All  of  the  increase  in  aggregate  demand  is  realized  by
the  U.S.  Of  course  if  demand  increases  far  enough,  prices  would  exceed  Plr
and  equilibrium  would  be  the  same  as  that  in  Figure  PL2.  Similarly,  if
aggregate  demand  shifts  toward  the  price  axis,  all  of  the  decrease  would  be
absorbed  by  the  U.S.  Changes  in  aggregate  demand  are  absorbed  by  the  U.S.
when  prices  are  determined  by  the  U.S.  loan  rate  mechanisms;  i.e.  the
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Figure  PL2.  Price and Determination of Exports  Under
U.S.  Price Leadership:  With  Different  Supply
Functions for U.S.
Where Scf  = supply for competitive fringe
DA  = aggregate export demand A  A Dus =  ABD  =  D  - Scf
Qcf = quantity exported  from competitive fringe
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Figure  PL3.  Price and Determination of Exports  Under
U.S.  Price Leadership:  Changes  in  Aggregate  Demand.
Where Scf  = supply for competitive  fringe
DA  = aggregate export demand
D  =  ABDA  =  DA  S us  ABDcf
Qcf  = quantity exported from competitive  fringe
Q, =  quantity exported from U.S.- 12  -
of  the  competitive  fringe  in  the  dominant  country  price  leadership  model  with
"sticky  prices."  This  is  primarily  due  to  the  rigidity  of  the  loan  rate  as  a
pricing  mechanism  in  export  competition.
Another  important  aspect  of  the  dominant  country  price  leadership  model
is  the  behavior  of  the  supply  function  of  the  competitive  fringe.  A crucial
determinant  of  the  market  power  of  the  U.S.  is  the  slope  of  Scf,  assuming  the
price  transmission  elasticity  exceeds  zero.  A more  price  elastic  (inelastic)
Scf  implies  a  more  elastic  (inelastic)  effective  demand  function  for  the  U.S.
Likewise,  a  more  price  inelastic  (elastic)  DA  implies  a more  inelastic
(elastic)  effective  demand  for  the  U.S.  Similarly,  shifts  in  Scf  result  in
shifts  in  the  U.S.  effective  demand  function.  Technological  improvements,
government  programs,  and  changes  in  input  prices  all  result  in  rightward
shifts  in  Scf  and  in  decreases  in  the  U.S.  effective  demand  function.  Thus,
U.S.  market  power  depends  on  supply  conditions  of  the  competitive  fringe,
which  is  the  appropriate  interpretation  of  recent  allegations  that  the  U.S.  is
the  "residual  supplier."
Constraints  in  the  logistics  and  transportation  system  of  some
exporters  in  the  competitive  fringe  have  played  an  important  role  in  the
international  wheat  market.  Both  Argentina  and  Canada  have  had  constraints  in
grain  handling  and  transportation  systems.  Decisions  were  made  in  the
mid-1970s  to  expand  the  capacity  of  the  Canadian  grain  handling  system,  and  by
the  early  1980s  these  objectives  were  met.  Argentina  continues  to  have
seasonal  problems,  but  its  capacity  has  increased  and  efficiency  improved
significantly  since  1979.  Constraints  in  the  logistical  system  for  exports
implies  that  at  some  point  the  excess  supply  function  of  the  competitive
fringe  becomes  very  inelastic,  or  perfectly  inelastic  as  shown  in  Figure  PL4.
The  effect  of  logistical  restrictions  in  the  competitive  fringe  is  for  a
relatively  more  inelastic effective  demand  function  for  the  U.S.  at  higher
prices  (AIBDA  in  Figure  PL4).  Expansion  of  export  capacity  and  increased
efficiency  means  the  perfectly  inelastic  portion  of  the  export  supply  function
shifts  rightward  (or  is  eliminated),  which  has  the  effect  of  mitigating  the
relatively  inelastic  portion  of  the  effective  demand  function  at  higher
prices. 6  Thus,  market  power  for  the  U.S.,  which  may  have  been  apparent  when
some  members  of  the  competitive  fringe  had  logistical  constraints,  has  been
reduced  or  eliminated  in  recent  years  as  those  problems  have  been  solved.
The  value  of  the  U.S.  dollar  has  an  important  influence  on  export
competition.  The  U.S.  dollar  was  undervalued  throughout  much  of  the  1970s,
and  has  become  allegedly  overvalued  in  the  1980s.  Longmire  and  Morey  (1983)
incorporated  the  changing  value  of  the  dollar  in  a spatial  equilibrium  model
assuming  competitive  conditions.  Appreciation  of  the  dollar  was  viewed  as  an
effective  ad  valorem  tax  on  U.S.  exports  and  was  introduced  as  a rotation  of
the  export  demand  function  toward  the  price  axis  (Figure  PL5).  The
distinguishing  feature  of  dollar  valuation  in  the  context  of  the  price
leadership  model  is  that  the  U.S.  export  demand  function  itself  is  a  residual.
Thus,  in  deriving  the  effective  U.S.  demand  function,  the  effect  of  the  dollar
6These  results  differ  if  the  dominant  country  has  logistical
constraints.  In  that  case  prices  for  the  competitive  fringe  increase  relative




Figure  PL4.  Price  and  Determination  of  Exports  Under
U.S.  Price  Leadership:  With  Logistical  Constraints
in  Competitive  Fringe.
Where Scf  = supply for competitive fringe
DA  = aggregate export demand
D  =ABDA  D A   S us  cf
Qcf  =  quantity exported from competitive  fringe






Qcf  cf  us  Qus  Q
Figure  PL5.  Price and Determination of Exports  Under
U.S.  Price Leadership:  With An Appreciating  U.S.
Dollar.
Where  Scf = supply  for competitive fringe
DA  =  aggregate export demand
D  =  ABD  D  - Scf US  cf
Qcf  =  quantity exported from competitive  fringe
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on  both  aggregate  demand  and  the  competitive  fringe  supply  must  be  captured.
Real  appreciation  of  the  dollar  not  only  serves  as  a  tax  on  the  aggregate
demand  function  (i.e.,  leftward  shift)  but  also  gives  incentives  to  expand
production  in  the  competitive  fringe. 7  The  results  are  that  the  effective
demand  function  for  U.S.  exports  becomes  flatter.  For  a  given  price  level
(i.e.,  loan  rate)  in  U.S.  dollars,  the  quantity  produced  and  exported  by  the
competitive  fringe  increases  and  that  exported  from  the  U.S.  decreases.  Real
appreciation  of  the  dollar  is  equivalent  to  an  ad  valorem  subsidy  to  foreign
competition,  rotating  their  supply  function  rightward.  Of  course,  real
depreciation  of  the  dollar  would  have  opposite  effects,  and  the  dynamics  of
adjustments  including  the  likely  irreversibilities  would  be  of  critical
importance.
So  long  as  members  of  the  competition  fringe  act  as  price  takers  and
have  positively  sloped  supply  functions,  the  U.S.  export  price  is  critical.
The  above  analysis  is  short-run  static  equilibrium.  Long-run  equilibrium
depends  on  the  cost  characteristics  of  both  the  U.S.  and  members  of  the
competitive  fringe  and  on  price  policies  of  the  price  leader.  If  prices
transmitted  to  the  competitive  fringes  are  high  enough  to  allow  positive
economic  profits,  their  capacity  and  exports  will  increase.  Several  members
of  the  competitive  fringe  in  international  wheat  have  taken  measures  to
increase  export  capacity  and  logistical  efficiency,  to  increase  productivity,
and  to  bring  new  land  under  cultivation;  some  of  these  measures  are
undoubtedly  irreversible.  The  ultimate  result  is  that  the  dominant  country
will  have  a  tendency  to  lose  market  share  through  time  (Worcester  1957).  In
the  long  run  the  dominant  country  price  leadership  model  has  a  tendency  to
break  down  in  the  absence  of  aggressive  pricing  on  the  part  of  the  leader  to
deter  expanded  production  by  the  competitive  fringe  and  other  potential
rivals.  Therefore,  the  price  leader  cannot  act  passively  in  pricing  policies.
The  dominant  country  price  leadership  model  is  inherently  unstable  and  will
normally  break  down  and  become  either  a competitive,  oligopolistic,  or
monopolistic  market  in  the  longer  term.
Exporting  Country  Behavior  and  Competitive  Strategies
The  current  wheat  market  is  operating  without  an  International  Wheat
Agreement  and  with  a  U.S.  loan  rate  program  in  the  absence  of  an  active  export
subsidy  mechanism,  both  of  which  facilitated  previous  oligopolistic
arrangements.  It  appears  that  the  structure  of  competition  in  the
international  market  for  wheat  is  evolving  to  one  characteristic  of  price
leadership,  with  the  U.S.  assuming  that  role,  and  to  a  price-taking
competitive  fringe  composed  of  all  other  exporters.  This  section  provides
evidence  which  would  support  this  market  structure.
Related  to  the  price  leadership  role  of  the  U.S.  is  the  cost  of
production  in  the  U.S.  compared  to  that  of  members  of  the  competitive  fringe.
7The  price  transmission  elasticity  to  producers  in  the  competitive
fringe  is  assumed  >  0  in  this  analysis.- 16  -
Prior  to  describing  the  market  strategies  in  each  country,  several  recent
studies  on  cost  of  production  are  presented.
The  U.S.  has  always  been  a relatively  low-cost  producer  of  commodities
such  as  wheat.  However,  in  light of  recent  actions  by  competitors,  the
cost-of-production  advantage  of  the  U.S.  has  been  questioned.  One  recent
study  compared  growth  rates  in  yields  in  the  U.S.  with  those  of  major
competitors  (ZuTauf  and  Steimer  1985).  Yield  comparisons  are  admittedly  an
imperfect  proxy  for  cost-of-production  comparisons  because  they  simply  measure
physical  productivity  of  one  input,  land.  Results  for  wheat  indicated  that
compound  annual  growth  rates  in  production  were  2.8  percent  during  1950-65,
1.6  percent  during  1965-75,  and  2.4  percent  during  1975-80.  For  comparison  to
gains  in  productivity  in  other  producing  and  exporting  countries,  a ratio  of
yields  in  the  U.S.  relative  to  the  rest  of  the  world  was  derived  for






The  U.S.  has  always  had  a yield  advantage  relative  to  the  rest  of  the  world.
That  advantage  increased  from  1950  to  1965,  at which  time  there  was  a  40
percent  advantage.  Since  then  that  advantage  decreased  and  in  1980  was  only
20  percent.  These  results  indicate  that  the  domestic  cost-of-production
advantage  has  declined  since  1965.  The  rapid  appreciation  of  the  dollar  since
1980  has  exacerbated  this  problem  and  caused  the  U.S.  cost-of-production
advantage  to  decrease  further.
Another  recent  study  analyzed  the  variable  cost  of  production  in
selected  exporting  countries  (Paarlberg  et  al.  1985).  Such  comparisons  are
fraught  with  problems  (see  p.  100  of  that  report  for  discussion  of  conceptual
and  empirical  problems)  but  do  give  an  indication  of  relative  advantage.
Following  are  the  average  variable  costs  (AVC)  for  wheat  production  in
selected  regions  of  the  U.S.  and  Canada  and  in  Australia:
1980  1981  1982
U.S.  $/Bushel
United  States
National  Average  1.52  1.61  1.55
Hard  Red  Winter  (HRW)  1.32  1.69  1.49
Hard  Red  Spring  (HRS)  1.94  1.47  1.35
Canada  (Saskatchewan)  1.29  1.31  1.24
Australia  1.47  2.45  2.25
SOURCE:  Paarlberg  et  al.  1985:101-2.- 17  -
The  higher cost per  bushel  for U.S.  HRS  in  1980 is  likely  due  to  the drought
condition  of  that year.8
Average  variable costs  in  the U.S.  exceeded  those in  Canada  in  each of
the  three years.  The  average variable  costs in  Canada were also less  than
those  for  U.S.  HRS,  the  appropriate  comparable wheat, in  each year.  Average
variable  costs in  Australia  increased in  1981 and  1982  due  largely  to  the
drought conditions  in  those years which reduced yields and increased  unit
costs.  Additional  results  indicated that prices  paid for  inputs  by  producers
in  U.S.  and Canada  had  comparable  increases from 1976  to  1982,  but Australian
input prices  increased  slightly more.  In  general  these  conclusions  indicate
that U.S.  average  variable costs  have exceeded  those in  Canada for  comparable
regions  but have  been  substantially  less  than  those in  Australia.
Competitive Developments
A  description of  recent competitive  developments of each exporter is
discussed  briefly in  this  section with  the  exception  of  Canada and Argentina,
which are  discussed in  greater  detail,  because it  appears their  role and/or
policies  have  changed  the  greatest  since  the early  1970s.
United States
The  United States has  not pursued policies  that directly affect market
prices  or exports  since  the  late  1960s.  In  recent years,  however,  loan rates
have  increased  to  equal  or  exceed world prices  and have  had  the effect of
decreasing U.S.  exports despite  increases in  world trade.  Thus,  the U.S.
policy  toward  exports has  been  fairly  passive  even though  several  attempts  have
been made  to  use  short-term solutions  (e.g.,  export PIK,  BICEP).
The implied competitive  strategy of  the  U.S.  has  had  several  important
components.  First,  the  U.S.  policy  has  had  limited  use  of  long-term bilateral
agreements  (LTAs).  These  have  not  been  pursued as  part of  an  export strategy
though LTAs  have  been  maintained with both  the  USSR and China.  The use of
credit for export sales,  however,  has  been  an  important component of  the
competitive  strategy.  Traditionally PL-480 sales were concessional  sales
because  of  their  repayment terms.  In  1979, with  the  introduction of  the
GSM-102 program, the  U.S.  policy  toward  credit changed from a  system of
government credit to  credit guarantees.  In  1982 the  "blended credit"  program
was  introduced  as a  combination of  GSM-102 and GSM-5,  the  latter being
interest-free direct government credits  (International  Wheat Council  1985).  In
this  program the  commercial  rates  under GSM-102 were blended with  the direct
government  credits  under  GSM-5.  The  proportion  of  sales  under  these  credit
programs  increased  from  14 percent  of  U.S.  wheat  exports  in  1981/82 to  40
percent in 1982/83 and 37  percent in 1983/84.  In  recent years the  U.S.  has
become  the  largest user  of  export credit measured in  total  and relative  sales.
Export credit  has  likely  been  used  to  partly offset  the relative  value of U.S.
prices in selected  markets.  Finally,  the U.S.  has  periodically used or
8Average  yield  per  harvested acre  in  1980 was  18.7  in North Dakota
compared  to  26.3  and  28.4  in  1979  and  1981,  respectively.- 18  -
attempted  to  use other enhancement programs  such  as  export PIK.  The $2
billion BICEP  program with  selected offers  to  Algeria  and Egypt are efforts at
offsetting  either  unfair  trade  practices  of  other  countries  or  the  relative
uncompetitive  position  of  the  U.S.
Canada
As  opposed  to  the  U.S.,  Canada  has  explicitly  pursued  policies  with  the
objective of  expandng export sales.  An  interpretation of one  of the
objectives of  the  Canadian Wheat Board Act is  to  market as much grain as
possible  at prices  it  considers reasonable.  McCalla  (1979)  interpreted
Canada's objective as  to maximize producer  revenue.  In  the 1950s-60s  this  was
implemented subject  to  perceived market power for  high  protein wheat and
entailed holding stocks  to  support prices.  More recently,  however,  it  appears
that Canada's market power has  diminished and  the  current strategy  is  to
produce  and market grains  to  fully  utilize the grain  handling and
transportation system  (Canadian Grain Council  1985;  Oleson  1979;  Canadian
Wheat Board 1985).
An  important  part of  their  competitive  strategy in  the  1970s was to
increase the  capacity  of  and  efficiency  of  the  grain  handling and
transportation  system.  In  the  1960s  Canada  held  stocks  as  an  exercise  of
market  power.  In  the  1970s  there  was a tremendous expansion in  aggregate
demand,  most  of  which  was  garnered  by  the  U.S.,  allegedly  because of  the  lack
of  and  inefficient  use  of  Canadian  grain  export  capacity.  Thus,  the  strategy
in  the  1970s  was  to expand  capacity and  increase  the efficiency  of  the grain
handling  and  transportation  system.  Interestingly, these decisions were made
in  the  1970s  based  upon  studies  or  commissions  initiated as  early as  1969.  In
1970 the Grain Transportation Technical  committee recommended improvements  in
the grain  handling  system and  increases in  throughput capacity.  The Block
Shipping System was  introduced  in  1970 (it  was  tested in  1969) and played a
major role in  subsequent increases  in  logistical  efficiency  (it  was originally
tested  in  1969).  In  1979  the Canadian  Wheat Board purchased 2,000 covered
hopper rail  cars in  a  controversial  decision, and  export capacity  has  expanded
at Prince  Rupert and other West Coast terminals.  Federal  and  provincial
governments also purchased covered  hopper cars--there are now  about 19,000
nonrailway  hoppers in  the  system.  In  1976 an export  target was set for  30 MMT
of all  grains and oilseeds by  1985,  but  this was met two years  early.  Another
goal  has  been set to  expand exports  to  36 MMT  by 1990  (International Wheat
Council  1985).  The  important points are  that the  capacity  of the  grain
handling and  transportation  system was expanded to  increase exports,
recognizing that this  had  been a  constraint;  these decisions  are  irreversible
and were based  on  decisions when  the dollar was valued  substantially less  than
in  recent years.
Credit sales  of Canadian wheat have  been  limited relative to  those of
the  U.S.  and  comprised only 13  percent of wheat and wheat flour exports  in
1983/84  (IWC).  Credit is offered at commercial  interest rates available to
the Board from financial  institutions  in Canada.  The most common  repayment
terms is for  10 percent down  and payback  in three annual  installations.  The
Board can  revise  some  of  the  terms  in order to  meet competition.- 19  -
More  important  to  the  Canadian  sales  strategies  is  the  increase  in  the
use  of  LTAs  since  the  1970s.  Canada  has  had  LTAs  with  China  and  the  USSR
since  1961  and  1963,  respectively.  However,  since  the  early  1970s  the
quantity  sold  under  LTAs  has  increased  tremendously.  The  following  table




Total  LTA  Excluding
Period  Committment  USSR  and  China
------------ Million  MT-----------
Pre-1970  15.0  0
1970-74  1.7  1.7
1975-79  7.0  3.6
1980-84  14.2  5.4
In  addition,  the  diversity  of  countries  with  LTAs  has  increased  and  now
includes  a  number  of  smaller  markets  (e.g.,  Norway,  Jamacia,  East  Germany).
Related  to  administration  of  an  LTA  sale  is  the  increased  use  of  direct
state-to-state  negotiation  over  price,  quality,  and  other  delivery  terms.
Recently  it  has  been  estimated  that  as  much  as  80  percent  of  Canadian  sales
come  under  this  type  of  arrangement.  The  purpose  of  increasing  LTA  sales  has
been  to  create  "brand  loyalty"  in  the  Telser  context  (1962),  which  is
particularly  important  in  declining  markets.  The  effects  are  that  prices
increasingly  are  negotiated  privately,  obviously  using  U.S.  prices  for
reference,  and  that  the  daily  "card  price"  of  export  offers  has  become
increasingly  of  lesser  importance  (Oleson  1979).
An  important  characteristic  of  the  international  competition  was  the
dominance  of  Canada  in  markets  for  higher  quality  wheat.  Indeed  this  is  what
allowed  Canada  to  exercise  market  power  and  be  the  price  leader  in  the  1960s.
Quality  has  two  important  dimensions  in  international  market  competition.  One
is  the  supply  of  high  protein  wheat  which  is  used  for  blending,  and  the  other
is  the  preservation  of  quality  throughout  the  marketing  system.  Due  to  strict
licensing,  cleaning,  grading,  blending,  and  other  restrictions,  Canada's  wheat
has  gained  the  reputation  of  being  superior  in  quality  to  that  of  the  U.S.
(Canadian  Wheat  Board).  In  recent  years,  there  has  been  much  discussion,
although  controversial  and  nonconclusive,  related  to  the  development  of  lower
protein  wheat  specifically  to  compete  with  lower  protein  U.S.  wheat  (Canada
Grains  Council  1985;  Loyns  et  al.  1985).  The  purpose  of  introducing  additional
varieties  would  be  to  take  advantage  of  growth  markets  which  are  perceived  to
be  for  lower  protein  wheats,  and  due  to  Canada's  strict  grading  and  handling
system,  development  of  these  varieties  (e.g.,  Hy  320)  would  allow  the  CWB  to
penetrate  these  markets.  Further,  in  many  areas  the  increase  in  yield would
more  than  offset  the  lower  price  received  for  these  varieties  and  producer
returns  would  increase.- 20  -
France
The export objective of France  is  difficult to  discern because  it  is
part of  the  European Economic Community  (EC) and  subject  to  provisions  of  the
Common Agricultural  Policy.  It  appears  France's objective is  to  dispose of
exportable supplies  at minimum cost  through  the  use  of export subsidies
(McCalla 1979).  French strategy  involves  using  subsidies  to  bring  down  the
level  of  the  domestic price  to  be  competitive with world prices.
Though  the  EC does  not grant credit  for exports of  grain, France does
use credit as part of  its  competitive  strategy.  Recently about 30  percent of
sales were under  credit arrangements.  Credit has  been granted  to  traditional
markets  (e.g.,  Egypt, Tunisia,  and Morocco)  to match  credit offered by
competing suppliers  (International  Wheat Council  1985).  Repayment is  at market
rates of  interest and  is  for  two  to  three years with a  COFACE  (France Export
Guarante  Agency) guarantee  of  95  percent.  France makes  limited use  of supply
agreements.
Australia
Exports  of wheat are marketed  through  the Australian Wheat Board  (AWB)
which operates  very  similarly  to  that of  Canada.  Australia's objective is
traditionally  stated as  to  maximize producer revenue  (McCalla 1979).  Variable
levels of  supply and export logistical  constraints  have  played an  important
role  in  the Australian  export strategy.  It  appears  that the Australian's
price  their exports  to  the  extent necessary  to  minimize ending  stocks.  Thus,
a minimal  level  of  pipeline stocks  are stored at year-end being dictated
somewhat by export capacity, which  has recently  been expanded,  and  also by
problems associated with  long-term storage.  As  opposed to  other countries,
Australia makes  limited  use  of  export credit, and  LTAs account for  only about
30 percent  of export sales.
Argentina
Given  the  financial  dilemma of  Argentina, it  is  fairly  clear  the
Argentinian export objective is  to  maximize export revenue.  To do  so  exports
are priced  to minimize year-end stocks and  to make  storage  space available for
soybeans,  corn,  and  other fall-harvested  grains and oilseeds.
The agricultural  policy  in  Argentina was relatively  constraining  until
1976 when  the military  junta  took over and  gradually returned control  to  the
private  sector.  Since  then  the agricultural  policy  has  become much more
export oriented.  Two major  components  of  policy  affecting agriculture include
taxes on  imports  and exports as  revenue  raising measures.  This  is in  addition
to  use  of a loan rate policy  on  wheat, though  it  is  generally  ineffective
because  it changes daily and  in response to  export market conditions.  Prior
to 1976  import taxes  on  most agricultural  inputs  exceeded 80  percent.  The
result was restricted use  of  more  productive technology,  chemicals,  seed, and
fertilizer, which limited growth rates  in  yields.  Since  then  these  taxes  have
been  gradually  reduced and more recently were  about 20  percent  (Mielke 1984).
As  a result, yields have  been  increasing and are  expected  to accelerate  in  the
future as  technology is adopted.  All  of  the major  exporters  have  had  slightly- 21  -
positively  trending  yields  since  the  1970s,  indicating  constant  productivity
growth  (Table  5 and  Figure  4).  However,  yields  in  Argentina  and  France  appear
to  have  accelerated  in  the  most  recent  five  years.  Following  is  the  average
percentage  increase  in  yields  for  the  five-year  period  before  and  after  1980:
Period  Argentina  Australia  Canada  France  U.S.
----------------------- percent-------------------
1975/1979  4.40  7.58  2.56  2.00  4.80
1980/1984  8.20  6.67  1.79  8.20  2.67
The  growth  in  Argentina  would  be  due  at least  in  part  to  the  policy  changes  in
the  mid-1970s  that  reduced  import  taxes  and  encouraged  increases  in
productivity. 9   Export  taxes  are  also  used  to  raise  revenue  and  are  currently
about  25  percent.  These  vary  through  time  and  in  response  to  market
conditions  and  in  what  appears  to  be  an  objective  to  maximize  tax  revenue.
These  export  taxes  have  been  reduced  recently.  In  addition  to  reducing  import
taxes,  another  proexport  decision  was  made  in  1979  which  would  allow  private
sector  ownership  and/or  leasing  of  export  facilities.  Prior  to  that  time  the
capacity  was  limited  and  was  inefficiently  utilized  and  managed,  thereby
constraining  exports.  Though  there  are  still  logistical  problems,  primarily
due  to  the  lack  of  incentives  to  storage,  there  have  been  significant
improvements  in  the  efficiency  of  the  exporting  system. 10
The  export  strategy  in  Argentina  is  primarily  to  price  cheap  enough  to
liquidate  stocks.  Most  of  the  sales  are  priced  to  be  shipped  within  the  first
half  of  the  marketing  year  to  allow  room  for  subsequently  harvested  crops.
There  are  no  credit  sales;  however,  LTAs  have  been  used  and  comprise  about  50
percent  of  sales.  Recently  there  has  been  a thrust  toward  increased  supply
agreements  and  exchange  arrangements  among  Latin  countries.
Recent  Competitive  Fringe  Behavior
Argentina,  France,  and  to  a lesser  extent,  Australia,  have  always  been
considered  part  of  the  price-taking  competitive  fringe.  The  discussion  above
and  evidence  presented  below  support  this  alledged  behavior.  The  actions  of
Canada,  on  the  other  hand,  suggest  that  they  no  longer  are  in  a position  of
exercising  market  power  and  do  in  fact  act  as  a price  taker  and  are  now  part
of  the  competitive  fringe.  The  implication  of  this  would  suggest  that  the
U.S.,  likely  by  default,  has  assumed  the  role  of  price  leader.  All  other
countries  effectively match  the  comparable  CIF  price,  which  is  determined
through  the  interaction  of  cash  and  futures  markets  subject  to  provision  of
9The  phenomenal  growth  in  productivity  in  France  is  likely  related  to
more  intensive  fertilization  in  response  to  favorable  price  ratios  (i.e.,
wheat  to  fertilizer)  and  higher  yielding  varieties.
1 0Despite  the  explosion  at  Bahia  Blanca  in  March  1985,  there  were
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government program variables,  primarily  the  loan  rate,  plus logistical  costs
and  margins.  The following  statements  support the existence of  the current
market structure:
*The U.S.  loan  rate acts  as a price floor,  which raises  the world
price.  Importing  nations  buy  less  because  of  the  higher prices.
Farmers in other exporting  countries respond  to  the  higher  price by
increasing  production.  It  does  not pay  these nations  to absorb  the
additional  production  by  holding stocks,  but instead  they export  it
at a price  just below  the  U.S.  price umbrella  (Paarlberg et al.  1985).
*The unique role of  the United  States, which  derives from  its  share of
world wheat  trade means it  is  both  the  "price setter"  and also  the
"price-taker"  in  the  sense  that American  exporters  have  to  price  their
wheat more  or  less  in  line with  the market.  Most other  grain
exporting  countries  set their wheat export prices with reference  to
U.S.  grain markets  (International  Wheat Council  1985).
In  the  discussion which  follows,  selected data are  presented which tentatively
support the  existence of  a  dominant-country  price leadership  model  with  the
U.S.  as  the  price  leader and all  others  (the  competitive fringe)  as  price
takers.
When  U.S.  and world stocks have  become  burdensome, the U.S.  has
traditionally introduced  supply  control  programs to  reduce  stocks  and raise or
maintain prices.  In  the  past much  of  this  burden  of  adjustment was  by  the
U.S.,  and  both Canada  and Australia cooperated in  attempts  to reduce  supply.
Most notable were  the  supply  control  measures in  1970  (see Figure  5).  Each
country with  the exception  of  France  had  notable reductions in  area  harvested.
This  joint effort  to reduce  supply  can  be explained either  by an  implicit or
explicit oligopolistic arrangement, or  because each  country felt it  could  have
a perceptible  influence  on  price via  its  output decision.  In  more  recent
attempts  at  supply  control  and stock-reduction,  the U.S.  has  not  had
cooperation from other major  exporters.  In  particular,  extensive acreage
reduction  programs affected  the  1982,  1983,  and  1984 crops in  the U.S.;
however, no explicit steps were  taken  during those years to  attempt to  control
supply.  Canada,  in  fact, increased area  planted  to wheat and  to  all  other
crops  through a  reduction  in  summerfallow in  each  of  these years.  Thus,  it
appears  that  the  main  competitors  who  have  shared  the  burden  of  stock
adjustment  are  no  longer  willing  to  do  so  or  at  recent  price  levels  have
tremendous  incentive  not  to  reduce  production.
The willingness and ability  to  carry  stocks  from one season  to  another
has  traditionally been  accepted as a prerequisite  to market power  (McCalla
1966; Alaouze,  Watson,  and Sturgess  1978).  Canada,  for  example, maintained
very  large  stocks  in  the  1960s,  alledgedly due  to  the  price  leadership
activities.  Other exporters,  being part of  the competitive fringe, minimized
their  levels  of  ending stocks.  Figure 6 (and Appendix Table  6) shows ending
stocks for  major wheat exporters  since  1960.  Ending stocks  have  generally
been  increasing  in  the  U.S.  since  1973 and  have  become fairly  high  in recent
years.  The projected  level  of  ending  stocks is expected  to  increase  further
in 1985/86  to  42.2 MMT.  There is  no  apparent trend in stocks with either
Argentina  or  France, which  illustrates  their  implicit policies  of minimizing
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minimizing year-end  stocks, despite relatively volatile  production.  In  the
past two years  stocks  have  increased  to abnormally  large  levels.  However,
this  increase was  by  default and was  due  to  the  record large  production in
1983/84, which  was abnormally  low in  quality  and which  took more  than one
marketing year  to dispose  of  as  feed wheat.  Consequently, there has  not been
a  change in  policy  regarding  stockholding.  On  the other  hand, there
apparently  has been a  change  in  Canada's  stockholding policy.  The  change in
policy  has  become  very apparent in  the  last several  years  during which
transportation was  not a  constraint and ending stocks were reduced  to a  record
low of  7.2 MMT in  1984/85.  Canada does  have a  tendency  to maintain  higher
stocks  than  other  members  of  the  competitive  fringe,  but  there  has  been  a
definite  change  in  policy  from  the  1960s  when  ending  stocks  averaged  14.4  MMT,
to  the  1980s when ending stocks in  each year were  less  than  or  equal  to  10.0
MMT.
Another way  to  examine  and  compare  stockholding  patterns  of  exporters
is  the  stocks/production ratio, which indicates  the amount of ending stocks
relative  to  production and  captures increases  in  the latter  through  time.
Figure 7 (and Appendix Table 7)  shows these  data  for each  of  the major
exporters.  The U.S.  stocks/production  ratio  has been  increasing  since 1980
and is  currently at 0.54.  There appears  to  be  no apparent trend  for either
Australia  or  France.  However,  the stocks/production ratio  has  decreased
significantly since  1980 for  both Canada  (Figure 7a)  and Argentina.  The
reduction for Canada  is  fairly  sharp with  an  average  value of 0.91 in  the
1960s  and 0.38  in  the  1980s.  These observations would suggest and  support a
definite change in  Canada's  export policy which  has become fairly apparent in
the  1980s,  though it  may  have  been building  since the  early 1970s.
Discussions  with  individuals  in  the  trade  indicated  that  in  1971  the Canadian
government  encouraged  the  CWB  to  increase  its  marketing efforts.  The  first
evidence of  the  change  in  behavior was  the extensive  liquidation of  barley
stocks  beginning in  1971/72,  followed by  increased liquidation  of wheat stocks
in  1973/74.  It  appears  that the Canadians  have  recognized their limited
ability  to  influence prices  through stockholding, have  improved their grain
handling and  transportation  system, and now  behave as a  price-taking member of
the  competitive fringe.
In  the  past year much anxiety  has been  raised aboutthe proposed
shipment of Argentine wheat to  the  U.S.  Allegations were raised that the
shipment was  economical  only  because of  unfair subsidies, but none were
applicable.  In  fact,  the export tax  policy  in  Argentina  should have  detracted
from the  economics of  the  sale.  The proposed  transaction was very  consistent
with  the  price-taking behavior  of competitive  fringe  sellers--in the  case of
Argentina it  is  actually  individual  producers which  comprise the fringe.  Of
particular  importance is  not the  transaction  itself but the mere fact that it
was  an  economical  arbitrage.
Little attention  has  been given  to  recent expanded imports of  Canadian
wheat to  the U.S.  In  the  1970s  there was generally very  little exportation of
wheat from Canada  to  the  U.S.  with only periodic  "border sales."  In the  past
three years,  however, exports  have  increased substantially  (Appendix Table 8).
The first large  transaction was  made in 1982/83  for  frost-damaged wheat.  Even
though it was  sold  as  "special  bin,"  much  of  it went into  commercial  milling
channels.  In 1984/85, the  imports  through June were 145,000 MT, were
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May,  and  June  (27,000, 19,000,  and  61,000 MT, respectively).  Though  these
amounts  appear small,  they would have  potentially  been  in competition with  HRS
wheat shipments from Duluth/Superior, whose  shipments during May and  June were
75,836 and 85,170 MT, respectively.
The size  or  detail  of  the  transactions  is not as  important  as  the
institutional  arrangements which allow  them  to  be  economical.  In  the  case of
HRS wheat, producers are  highly  participative  in  farm  programs  (in  excess of
90 percent in  the  past three years).  At and  immediately  following harvest,
sales  of  free  stocks and wheat ineligible  for  the program  are made  and shipped
prior  to December.  In  the  postharvest period,  free stocks  become very  tight,
and  the normal  market response is  for  increases in  the  basis and/or futures  to
attract wheat away  from storage  to  meet mill  and export demand.  However,  in
the past few years  the Canadian  sales were made in  the  period commencing with
the  opening  of  the Great Lakes shipping  season.  Though  these  sales were
relatively  small,  the  important point is  the willingness of  Canada  to price
wheat to  sell  and  deplete stocks  to  abnormally  low  levels, which  is  very
consistent with a  competitive fringe  price taker.
Data  presented in  this  section  illustrate  that  (1)  in  previous years
export competitors  participated  in  supply reduction  programs, but in  recent
years  they  have  not;  and  (2)  each exporter,  including Canada,  has followed a
policy  of minimizing  carryover  stocks in  recent years.  The  lack of
cooperation  in  supply  control  is  likely an  indication  that each member of  the
competitive  fringe is  too  small  to  have an  influence  on  price  through output
decisions.  A  major change  in  the  structure  of  international  competition  in
wheat is  that Canada, who  previously  influenced prices  by  storing  stocks,  now
apparently  has  pursued a strategy  of  liquidating year-end  stocks  similar to
other members  of  the  competitive  fringe.  The effects of  these  two  phenomena
are  supportive  of  the notion  that the U.S.  is  now  the  price  leader and all
other exporters  in  the  international  wheat market are price  takers.
Conclusions and  Implications
International  trade in  wheat has  evolved  from an  oligopoly  in  which
Canada was  the  price  leader  during the  1950s  and  1960s,  to  a  competitive
equilibrium in  the  1970s,  to what appears  to  be a price leadership model  with
the U.S.  being  the  price leader in  the  1980s.  The earlier  oligopolistic
structure was  facilitated  by  an  active  International  Wheat Agreement and an
active U.S.  subsidy mechanism for  price determination.  Neither  of  these is
present  in  today's  environment.  Currently,  U.S.  farm programs, particularly
the  loan rate  program, play  a  dominant role in  the international  price
structure  for wheat.  It  is  the interaction  between cash and futures markets
with  the  loan  program which determine FOB  and CIF prices, which are  effectively
ceiling  prices for  the  price-taking  competitive fringe.  It  is in this  indirect
way  that  the  U.S.  has  assumed  the role  of  price  leader, although it was
probably  not intentional.
There are  several  important aspects  of  the dominant-country  price
leadership model.  The U.S.  is  assumed  to  be  the  leader, although  passive,  and
all  others make  up  the  competitive fringe,  are price-takers,  act independently,
and are each  individually  too  small  to  have a perceptible influence  on  price.
The  supply function for  the  competitive  fringe  is critically  important in this- 30  -
market structure and  largely determines the  effective demand  function  for the
U.S.  A  more elastic competitive  fringe supply  implies a more elastic effective
U.S.  demand.  Technological  improvements and expansion in exporting capacity,
each of  which are  largely irreversible, result in reductions  in the  effective
demand function  for  the  U.S.  With  "sticky prices"  determined by  the U.S.  farm
programs,  changes in  aggregate demand  are all  absorbed by  the  U.S. in  terms of
stock and  supply  adjustment.  Recent appreciation of  the  U.S.  dollar was  also
demonstrated  to  adversely affect the effective export demand function  for  the
U.S.  by  simultaneously reducing aggregate demand and  increasing  competitive
fringe supply  (introduced as  shifts when measured in  U.S.  dollars).
The  export strategies by  each  of  the major wheat exporters  tend  to
support a  price  leadership model.  France, Argentina, and Australia  have
always  had  implicit policies  to minimize  the  level  of ending  stocks and  have
priced exports  to reach  that level.  Canada,  on  the other  hand,  did maintain
abnormally large stocks  in  the  1960s  as  an exercise of market power  to  support
prices.  More recently,  however,  there  has obviously  been a  major decision  to
increase  exports and reduce  the  levels  of  ending  stocks, which is  a
recognition of  reduction  of market power.  Decisions related  to  this change in
policy were  likely  made in  the early  1970s  but have  not become  blatantly
apparent until  the  1980s due  to  the concurrent logistical  inability  to expand
exports in  the  earlier period.  The  level  of  ending  stocks decreased
significantly since  1980 and in  1984/85 will  be a  record  low.  Also in  these
last  three years  there  have  been relatively  sizable exports  to the  U.S.  from
Canada in  what appears  to  be more  than  border sales, but are economical  simply
due  to  the  price structure  for  U.S. wheat in  the  postharvest period.  These
observations support  the  theory  that all  exporters  now aggressively price
their  exports with  the objective  of  carrying over minimal  ending  stocks.
International  competition in  wheat trade has  also  seen a  proliferation
of  nonprice, and possibly  price, variables.  The  major export expansion  tool
for  the  U.S.  has been  the  use  of  credit.  Other  exporters also  increased their
use  of  credit offerings,  but not as  extensively as  the U.S.  Each  of  the  other
exporters  have also aggressively sought long-term bilateral  trade agreements
(LTAs).  Most notable is  the  distinct increase  in  LTAs  by  Canada  since  the
pre-1970 era.  Canada  has  increased  both  the  diversity of  countries  using LTAs
as well  as  the  proportion of  sales  under LTAs.  As a  result, prices  and
delivery  terms  have  been  increasingly  determined on a  state-to-state
negotiation  and  not easily discerned  by  other market participants.  Other
countries are  using  LTAs  to a  lesser extent, and  those used by  the  U.S.  are
minimal.
There have  been  several  critical  decisions made  by major  competitiors
which will  likely  continue  to affect the  U.S.  in  the longer  term.  Of
particular importance are  the decision by  Argentina in  1976  to reduce  import
taxes and  increase utilization  of more productive  inputs;  a decision in  1979
to allow private firms  to own  and/or lease export facilities in  Argentina,
resulting in improved  logistical  efficiency; a series of related Canadian
decisions to  expand export capacity and  improve logistical  efficiency
commencing  from the  early  1970s;  and  the apparent development in Canada of
wheats  of  different quality  characteristics, but higher yielding.  All  of
these decisions  result in rightward shifts  in supply and/or  in removing
constraints  to  increased exports  (i.e.,  making export  supply more elastic at
higher  price levels)  and in a simultaneous reduction  in the effective U.S.- 31  -
export  demand  function.  Of  particular  importance  is  that  first,  those
decisions  were  made  in  the  early  to  mid-1970s  when  the  dollar  was  undervalued.
Second,  their  impacts  on  the  effective  export  supply  function  are  dynamic  and
take  an  extended  period  for  adoption.  Finally,  by  nature  of  the  decisions
there  are  likely  very  important  irreversibilities  which  will  make  the  supply
function  very  inelastic  for  price  reductions.
There  are  several  important  implications  of  a dominant-country  price
leadership  market  structure.  First,  if  the  U.S.  continues  to  pursue  a  passive
role  in  pricing  (i.e.,  by  not  accounting  for  shifts  in  aggregate  demand  and
competitive  fringe  supply),  expansion  in  the  competitive  fringe  will  continue
and  U.S.  market  share  will  decrease.  Second,  if  effective  export  prices
remain  relatively  inflexible,  the  U.S.  will  continue  to  absorb  the  shocks  in
aggregate  demand  and  competitive  fringe  supply.  And  third,  because  the
decisions  which  have  resulted  in  expanded  exports  by  the  competitive  fringe
are  largely  irreversible,  a relatively  long  adjustment  period  to  reductions  in
U.S.  prices  will  be  necessary.  Typically,  a  dominant-country  price  leadership
structure  would  be  a  short-run  phenomenon.  In  the  longer  run,  a  more
aggressive  role  in  export  pricing  by  the  U.S.  would  require  taking  the  market
fundamentals  into  consideration,  namely  supply  response  of  the  competitive
fringe  and  aggregate  demand.  In  doing  so,  the  market  structure  would  have  a
tendency  to  evolve  either  toward  some  type  of  cooperative  oligopoly  or
competition.Appendix- 35  -
APPENDIX TABLE 1.  EXPORTS OF  WHEAT FROM MAJOR EXPORTERS  (ARGENTINA,
AUSTRALIA, CANADA,  FRANCE, UNITED  STATES)  AND WORLD  TOTAL,  1960-84
















































































































































































SOURCE:  Foreign Agricultural  Circular,  Grains:
Outlook,  Various  Issues.
World Grain Situation  and- 36  -
APPENDIX TABLE 2.  MARKET SHARE  OF  MAJOR EXPORTERS OF  WHEAT, 1960-84
























































































































































SOURCE:  Foreign Agricultural
Outlook, Various  Issues.
Circular, Grains:  World  Grain Situation and- 37  -
APPENDIX TABLE 3. SELECTED WORLD WHEAT  PRICES
CIF  Rotterdam
Canada
Marketing  Price  FOB  U.S.  Gulf  U.S.  DNS  CWRS
Years 1   Support  HR  Wheat  14%  No.  1
- --------------------------- $/MT-------------
1960  65  62  - 73
1961  66  63  - 76
1962  74  64  --  76
1963  67  66  75  78
1964  48  64  74  77
1965  46  60  71  78
1966  46  67  76  80
1967  46  62  --  76
1968  46  63  70  73
1969  46  53  69  72
1970  46  60  74  74
1971  46  60  70  72
1972  46  91  100  102
1973  46  177  202
1974  50  164  204  207
1975  50  152  188  206
1976  83  113  141  146
1977  83  116  134  147
1978  86  141  158  166
1979  92  174  200  216
1980  110  182  217  218
1981  118  171  193  214
1982  130  159  180  194
1983  134  154  186  202
1984  121  150*  176*  189*
*Preliminary.
1July/June  until  1976,  July/May  thereafter.
SOURCE:  International  Wheat Council,  Various Reports.- 38  -
APPENDIX TABLE 4.  AREA HARVESTED  FROM MAJOR  EXPORTERS OF WHEAT,  1960-84
Year  Argentina  Australia  Canada  France  U.S.  World
















































































































































































SOURCE:  Foreign Agricultural  Circular, Grains:
Outlook,  Various  Issues.
World Grain Situation and- 39  -
APPENDIX TABLE  5.  WHEAT  YIELD FOR MAJOR WHEAT EXPORTERS AND WORLD AVERAGE
Year  Argentina  Australia  Canada  France  U.S.  World
















































































































































































SOURCE:  Foreign Agricultural  Circular,  Grains:
Outlook,  Various  Issues.
World  Grain  Situation  and- 40  -
APPENDIX TABLE 6.  ENDING STOCK FOR MAJOR WHEAT  EXPORTERS AND WORLD TOTAL
Year  Argentina  Australia  Canada  France  U.S.  World









































































































































































SOURCE:  Foreign Agricultural Circular, Grains:
Outlook,  Various  Issues.
World  Grain  Situation  and
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APPENDIX TABLE 7.  STOCK/PRODUCTION  RATIO OF MAJOR WHEAT EXPORTERS AND WORLD
AVERAGE1
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1Marketing  Year,  August/July.
2Through  June  1985.
3Including:  7,245  No.  1  CW  13.5  percent  protein;
99,060  No.  1  CW  14.5  percent  protein;  12,145  No.  2  CW;
and  26,255  No.  3  CW.
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